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About 35 years ago Wheeler introduced the motto “law without law” to highlight the possibility
that (at least a part of) Physics may be understood only following regularity principles and few rele-
vant facts, rather than relying on a treatment in terms of fundamental theories. Such a proposal can
be seen as part of a more general attempt (including the maximum entropy approach) summarized
by the slogan “it from bit”, which privileges the information as the basic ingredient. Apparently
it seems that it is possible to obtain, without the use of physical laws, some important results in
an easy way, for instance, the probability distribution of the canonical ensemble. In this paper we
will present a general discussion on those ideas of Wheeler’s that originated the motto “law without
law”. In particular we will show how the claimed simplicity is only apparent and it is rather easy
to produce wrong results. We will show that it is possible to obtain some of the results treated by
Wheeler in the realm of the statistical mechanics, using precise assumptions and nontrivial results
of probability theory, mainly concerning ergodicity and limit theorems.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an influential paper1 reporting his Oersted Medal
Response at the joint APS-AAPT Meeting (25 January
1983) John Archibald Wheeler posed the following bold
problem: Is it possible to build part of Physics only fol-
lowing regularity principles (RP)? In other words, can
we understand (at least a part of) Physics without refer-
ring to fundamental theories (e.g., classical or quantum
mechanics)?
Wheeler proposed the “law without law” program. For
instance, in Ref. [1] he discussed three examples which,
in his opinion, support the approach in terms of RP:
(i) the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution of the canonical en-
semble;
(ii) the universality of critical exponents;
(iii) the statistical features of heavy nuclei.
Regarding point (i), Wheeler wonders: “How can stupid
molecules ever be conceived to obey a law so simple and
so general? [...] What regulating principle accomplished
this miracle?”. And then he adds: “No small answer can
ever hope to live up to a question so great”.
According to Wheeler1, Physics may be divided into
three Eras:
• Era number one (Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo) is
characterized by the discovery of the simplicity of motion;
• Era number two (starting with Newton) is marked by
the concept of physical laws;
• Era number three (present time) is ruled by regulating
principles, i.e., “chaos behind law”.
Here, the basic idea is that chaotic behavior and regu-
lating principles can fruitfully cooperate and give rise to
approximated laws. Let us note that Wheeler uses the
term “chaos” in a wide sense, i.e., without the technical
meaning of sensitivity to the initial conditions.
His message can be summarized in the motto(
higgledy − piggledy
)
+
(
regulating principle
)
=(
law of physics
)
. (1)
Wheeler’s proposal can be seen as a part of a more gen-
eral program whose famous slogan is “it from bit”, sug-
gesting that the ultimate building block upon which we
should base our knowledge of the World is information2.
Deutsch3, discussing Wheeler’s idea, puts forward the
following dilemma: are the regulating principles ana-
lytic or synthetic propositions? He then tried to rewrite
Wheeler’s proposal in the less inspiring form(
stochastic laws
)
→(
approximate “deterministic laws”
)
. (2)
Surely the proposal by Wheeler, even in the weaker
Deutsch’ form, is quite vague, on the other it is somehow
part of a general approach to physics where the main in-
gredients are information and inference. Our main aim
is a critical discussion of the limits of such an approach.
In particular, we will show that the examples discussed
by Wheeler can appear as consequences of general reg-
ulatory principles only a posteriori. Actually they fol-
low from results of probability theory that are far from
trivial, basically the main ingredients are limit theorems,
namely:
• The Boltzmann Gibbs law follows from the microcanon-
ical distribution, which is based on (some form of) the
ergodic hypothesis.
• The universality of the statistical features of heavy nu-
clei is a sort of ergodicity: the single (large) nucleus is
well described by its average properties.
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2• The universal properties of critical phenomena can be
seen as a generalization of the central limit theorems.
In Sec. II we address the issue of the Boltzmann-Gibbs
distribution, discussing an enlightening conjecture by
Ulam, the notion of “bridge law”, the ergodic hypothesis
and Khinchin’s approach, and the microcanonical distri-
bution. In Sec. III we cast our reflections about Wheeler’s
proposal into a wider perspective, discussing the case of
universality in critical phenomena. In Sec. IV we address
the role and meaning of the maximum entropy principle,
comment upon the actual role of probability in statistical
physics. Some final remarks are found in Sec. V.
II. THE BOLTZMANN-GIBBS DISTRIBUTION
OF THE CANONICAL ENSEMBLE
Let us briefly discuss some general aspects of the foun-
dations of the statistical mechanics, in particular the
role of ergodicity and of the many degrees of freedom
in macroscopic objects4–6.
We owe to Ludwig Boltzmann’s ingenuity two great
ideas in modern Physics5,7:
(A) the introduction of probability in the physical realm;
(B) the bridge between the microscopic dynamics, and
the macroscopic description of the physical world, which
is based on a phenomenological theory, named thermo-
dynamics.
Before discussing in some detail Boltzmann’s ap-
proach, we open a brief digression about an interesting
conjecture by Ulam, which helps to clarify some aspects
about statistical laws in physics, in particular the un-
avoidable role of the dynamics, or at least some aspects
of the laws ruling the time evolution.
A. An interlude about Stupid Molecules and
Boltzmann’s law
In his paper [1], Wheeler writes: How can stupid
molecules ever be conceived to obey a law so simple and
so general? [...] What regulating principle accomplished
this miracle? And then he adds “No small answer can
ever hope to live up to a question so great”. He dis-
cusses a model of N oscillators sharing quanta of energy,
wondering how in the limit N  1 one see how stupid
molecules, sharing energy higgledy-piggledy, nevertheless
end on the average obeying Boltzmann’s law? He then
concludes that this in an example of “law without law”
according to [1].
Let us briefly discuss an interesting conjecture of
Ulam’s. Consider a (large) system with N particles and
the following stochastic rule: at time t a pair (i, j) is
selected at random, these two particles perform a “col-
lision” which preserves the total energy but allows for a
redistribution of the energy according to the rule:
Ei(t+ 1) = X(t)
[
Ei(t) + Ej(t)
]
,
Ej(t+ 1) = [1−X(t)]
[
Ei(t) + Ej(t)
]
,
where X(t) is a random variable independent of X(t −
1), and takes values in [0, 1]. Ulam conjectured that,
if X is uniformly distributed, starting from any initial
distribution of the energy, asymptotically Boltzmann’s
probability density for the energy holds: PE(E) = αe
−αE
where α = 1/E0 is determined by the mean energy E0
per particle at t = 0.
The above conjecture has been proved in a rigorous
way by Blackwell and Mauldin8. In addition it is possible
to generalize the result to the case of a generic probability
distribution PX(X): independently of the initial distri-
bution of the energy, asymptotically one has a conver-
gence to an invariant probability density for the energy
PE(E) whose shape depends on PX(X). For instance, if
PX(X) = δ(X − 12 ), using the law of large numbers it
is possible to show that PE(E) = δ(E − E0) where E0
is the mean energy per particle at t = 0. In Fig. 1 we
report numerical calculations obtained for a system with
N = 50000 particles, undergoing 500000 collisions. The
last (asymptotic) distribution is smoothened by averag-
ing over the last 500 realizations.
The results in Ref. [8], as well as the above simple nu-
merical computations, show in an unambiguous way the
relevance of the “correct rule”. Only for a specific PX(X)
one obtains the proper physical results: it is necessary to
use a suitable stochastic law, while a generic “higgledy-
piggledy rule” is not enough. The different results with
varying PX(X) are somehow related to Bertrand’s well-
known paradox in probability theory9: the probability
p that, considering an equilateral triangle inscribed in a
circle, and picking at random a chord of the circle, the
chosen chord is longer than a side of the triangle, de-
pends on the way we interpret the prescription “at ran-
dom”. For instance, if the two end points of the chord are
uniformly distributed along the circumference, this prob-
ability is p = 13 ; if the midpoint of the chord is uniformly
distributed along a randomly chosen radius, p = 12 ; if the
midpoint of the chord is uniformly distributed over the
entire circle, p = 14 . From these results one concludes
that the term “at random” is ambiguous and therefore a
precise prescription is needed to compute p.
We close this interlude noting that it is possible to re-
formulate Ulam’s approach in terms of velocity. A partic-
ularly interesting case is given the granular gases where
in the inelastic collision between two granular particles
the momentum is preserved and in addition each particle
interacts with a thermal bath. At variance with the elas-
tic case the probability distribution of the velocity is not
Gaussian and shows long tails10 whose details depend on
the parameters of the collision rules, e.g. the restitution
coefficient and the characteristic time of the interaction
particle-bath.
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FIG. 1. Top panel: Probability distribution of the energy PE(E/E0), for various distributions densities PX(X) which are
constant over a given interval I ⊂ [0 : 1], and zero outside it: red line, I = [0 : 1]; green line, I = [0.1 : 0.9]; blue line,
I = [0.2 : 0.8]; purple line, I = [0.3 : 0.7]; light blue line, I = [0.4 : 0.6]; brown line, I = [0.45 : 0.55]. Boltzmann’s probability
density e−E/E0 is highlighted by the empty circles. Bottom panel: Probability distribution of the energy PE(E/E0), for various
symmetric nonuniform distributions densities PX(X) = PX(1−X), X ⊂ [0 : 1] (the expression for X ≤ 12 is given): pale green
line, PX(X) = 10(2X)
9; green line, PX(X) = 3(2X)
2; blue line, PX(X) = 4X; purple line, PX(X) =
3
2
√
2X; light blue line,
PX(X) = 1/(2
√
2X); the result for a uniform distribution is reported for comparison (red line). Again, Boltzmann’s probability
density e−E/E0 is highlighted by the empty circles.
B. Bridge law
The issue (B) can be summarized by the well-known
relation
S = κ logW, (3)
which is engraved on Boltzmann’s tombstone in Vienna.
Actually the above equation, usually called Boltzmann’s
law, has been written by Planck7.
Being H(Q,P) the Hamiltonian of a given system
whose particles are in a volume V , S is the entropy (a
thermodynamic quantity),
W(E, V,N) = 1
N !h3N
∫
E<H(Q,P)<E+∆E
d3NQd3NP
(4)
is the “volume of phase space” (the space of all the coor-
dinates Q and the momenta P specifying a microscopic
configuration) accessible to a macroscopic configuration
of N particles with energy in the interval [E,E+ ∆E], κ
is a dimensional constant (the Boltzmann constant) and
h is another dimensional constant (the Planck constant).
A simple, yet important, remark to the bridge law is
in order here. Often, even in good textbooks (see, e.g.,
Ref. [11]), one can read that the bridge law between ther-
modynamics and mechanics is given by the equation
〈 kinetic energy per particle 〉 = 3
2
κT,
relating the average kinetic energy of a particle with the
absolute temperature T . This relation, which was al-
ready known to Daniel Bernoulli, holds in systems whose
Hamiltonian contains the usual kinetic term
∑
kP
2
k/2m.
4On the other hand it cannot be valid for a system with
a generic Hamiltonian. As an important example we can
mention those systems which can have negative temper-
atures, e.g., point-vortex systems in two-dimensional in-
viscid fluids12.
Eq. (3), with W(E, V,N) given by Eq. (4), is the
true bridge law, joining mechanics, i.e. W(E, V,N), and
thermodynamics, i.e. S(E, V,N). Once W(E, V,N) is
known, we have the entropy and therefore the tempera-
ture T and the pressure P can be obtained through
1
T
=
(
∂S
∂E
)
V,N
;
P
T
=
(
∂S
∂V
)
E,N
.
C. The ergodic hypothesis
The issue (A) is rather subtle, and is still an open
question. To shed light on this problem, let us con-
sider a macroscopic system with N interacting parti-
cles, whose microscopic state is described by the vector
X ≡ (Q1, ...,QN ;P1, ...,PN ) ∈ R6N . When an instru-
ment measures a physical observable quantity, e.g., the
pressure, it performs a time average of some function of
X,
1
T
∫ T
0
A(X(t)) dt, (5)
over the observation time T . Of course, in order to de-
termine the time evolution X(t), the knowledge of the
initial condition X(t = 0) is needed. However, even in
this case, the program can be accomplished only for sys-
tems composed of a reasonably small number of particles
and is definitely hopeless when N grows as large as the
Avogadro number (the number of H2 molecules contained
in just 2 grams of molecular hydrogen).
Boltzmann’s ingenious idea consists in replacing the
time average in Eq. (5) with a suitable average over
phase space, assuming that
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
A(X(t)) dt =
∫
A(X)ρmicro(X) dX, (6)
where ρmicro(X) is the microcanonical probability den-
sity. The limit T → ∞ is necessary from a mathematical
point of view4,5 and it is physically well justified. The
reason is that the usual observation time is much larger
than the typical molecular times, e.g., the mean collision
time in gases and liquids, or the oscillation periods in
solids, which are O(10−10 s). Once Eq. (6) is assumed to
be valid in the limit of large N , in the presence of short-
range interactions, it is straightforward to derive, for a
system exchanging energy with a much larger external
environment, the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution for the
canonical ensemble
ρcan(X) = Const. e
−βH(X),
with β ≡ 1/(κT ).
Now, after the Fermi-Pasta-Ulam simulations6,12 and
the Kolmogorov-Arnol’d-Moser theorem13, it is quite
clear that, strictly speaking, the EH cannot be valid. On
the other hand, in one of the most common and powerful
method used in the numerical computation, the molecu-
lar dynamics14, the time average of observables are com-
puted assuming the validity of (6).
Why, in spite of the failure of the ergodicity, the re-
sults obtained with the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution are
valid? In particular why is it in agreement with the re-
sults of molecular dynamics? Let us briefly discuss the
physical reasons which allow for the practical success of
the standard computational techniques used in statistical
mechanics.
Following Khinchin’s approach15, it can be show that
the EH is essentially true if (i) the system under study
consists of a large number of particles, (ii) only “suitable”
observable quantities are considered, and (iii) we allow
for Eq. (6) to fail in a “sufficiently small region” (i.e.,
with a small probability). Khinchin was indeed able to
show that for sum functions like
f(X) =
N∑
k=1
fk(Qk,Pk) (7)
the inequality
Probability
(
|δf(X)| ≥ c1
N1/4
)
≤ c2
N1/4
holds, where δf(X) is the difference between the time
average starting from X and the ensemble average, and
c1, c2 are numerical constants. In the above equation the
probability of the event |δf(X)| ≥ c1N−1/4 is computed
according to the microcanonical distribution.
The result, originally obtained by Khinchin for systems
of non interacting particles, and then extended by Mazur
and van der Linden16, to systems of particles interacting
through a short-range potential, can be summarized as
follows: although the EH does not hold in a rigorous
mathematical sense, it is still “physically” valid provided
a) we are interested only in suitable observables, with the
shape (7);
b) we are a bit “tolerant” and accept that ergodicity holds
O(N−1/4), i.e., the difference between the time average
and the ensemble average is O(N−1/4);
c) ergodicity can fail in regions whose probability is as
small as O(N−1/4), which vanishes for N →∞.
Khinchin’s result is a good example of what is usually
called an emergent property: the dynamics has a marginal
role, in the sense that in this context the crucial ingredi-
ent is the large number of particles N , being related to
a technical aspect of probability theory, i.e., the Law of
large numbers17. Of course the details of the dynamics
can have also a rather important role, e.g., this is a quite
clear in Ulam’s model discussed in Sec. 2.1. Basically in
all the problems of non equilibrium statistical physics it
is not possible to avoid a treatment in terms of the un-
derlying dynamics, see, e.g., the many delicate topics in
the celebrated Fermi-Pasta-Ulam problems18.
5D. On the microcanonical distribution
Let us open a short digression about the microcanon-
ical distribution ρmicro(X) which is constant if H(X) ∈
[E,E + ∆E] and zero otherwise.
Such an assumption sometimes is justified with the
following argument: since we cannot be able to have
a control of a complex system with a large number of
components, we assume that probability distribution is
uniform in the allowed region. The above reasoning is
not convincing: consider the variable X with a uniform
probability density ρX(X) in a certain region, then the
probability density ρY (Y) of another variableY = F(X),
in general is not constant, therefore a uniform distribu-
tion, at variance with some folklore, has no special status
among the possible distributions; in the following we will
discuss again this point.
In our opinion the true physical good reason to
adopt the microcanonical distribution is the following:
ρmicro(X) is a stationary solution of the Liouville’s equa-
tion. We can say that the dynamics, somehow, enters in
the selection of the probability.
III. CRITICAL PHENOMENA
The second case discussed by Wheeler can be under-
stood in a similar way: in critical phenomena, the univer-
sal behavior near the critical point is explained by means
of the Renormalization Group, which has a probabilistic
interpretation in terms of generalized central limit theo-
rems for non independent aleatory variables19.
It is well known that, for the validity of the central limit
theorem, two necessary conditions must be met: the ran-
dom variables must have a finite variance and be uncor-
related (or weakly correlated). Assume that the random
variables x1, ..., xn are independent and identically dis-
tributed with p(x) having zero mean and σ < +∞, the
variable yn =
1
σ
√
n
(x1 + ... + xn) is distributed accord-
ing to a normalized Gaussian distribution. In the case
p(x) ∼ |x|−α, with 1 < α < 3, σ = +∞ and we have an-
other limit theorem: the variable yn =
1
nβ
(x1 + ...+ xn),
with β = 1/(α − 1), for n  1, is distributed according
to the so-called Le´vy stable distribution Lα(x), and at
large |x| one has Lα(x) ∼ |x|−α. As an explicit example,
where it is possible to write L2(x), we can cite the case of
the Cauchy-Lorentz distribution Pγ(x) =
γ
pi (x
2 + γ2)−1,
whose variance is infinite and in this case, for large n, the
sample average 1n (x1 + ...+xn) is not distributed accord-
ing to a Gaussian, rather it follows the Cauchy-Lorentz
distribution with exactly the same parameter γ as the
individual variables. Thus, averaging Cauchy-Lorentz-
distributed variables does not lead to a narrower distri-
bution.
The ubiquitous occurrence of the Gaussian distribu-
tion in statistical physics is ultimately due to the fact
that correlations are usually short-ranged. However, ap-
proaching the critical point that marks a second order
phase transition, with varying a control parameter like
the temperature, the microscopic degrees of freedom be-
come correlated on larger and larger scales. As a result,
very different physical systems manifest striking similar-
ities in their nearly critical behavior. For instance, sev-
eral physical quantities tend to diverge (or vanish) as a
power law when approaching the phase transition point,
and different systems are characterized by the very same
set of critical exponents (the numbers that characterize
the power-law divergence, or vanishing, of various phys-
ical quantities). All the systems sharing the same set of
critical exponents are said to belong to the same class
of universality20. In Wheeler’s perspective, the question
might be cast in the following manner: How can very dif-
ferent physical systems “know” that they will share the
same set of critical exponents? It is now clear that the
universality of critical phenomena can be understood in
terms of deviations from the central limit theorem, and a
new class of limit theorems in probability theory is indeed
required to properly describe the properties of a physical
system near a second order phase transition.
The idea underlying critical phenomena is that the
variables that provide a microscopic description of a
given system become more and more correlated when ap-
proaching a phase transition, so that the conditions that
guarantee that the macroscopic variables, obtained by av-
eraging over the microscopic degrees of freedom, follow
a Gaussian distribution (as a consequence of the central
limit theorem) are violated. The renormalization group
approach provides the technical tool to derive the asymp-
totic distributions. A prototypical model21 that illus-
trates this increasingly strong correlation is described by
a Hamiltonian defined on a set of 2N variables xi, obeying
the following hierarchical structure (see also Fig. 2):
Hk(x1, ..., x2k) = Hk−1(x1, ..., x2k−1)
+ Hk−1(x2k−1+1, ..., x2k)
− γk
 2k∑
i=1
xi
2
2 , (8)
with k = 1, ..., N , H0 = 0 and the coupling γ satisfy-
ing 1 < γ < 2 (for γ < 1 the hierarchical interaction
scales to zero and the system is trivial, for γ > 2 the
system is thermodynamically unstable). Let us assume
for simplicity that the distribution of the individual xi is
Gaussian:
p0(x) =
1√
2pi
e−x
2/2,
with unit variance. In this case, starting from the Gibbs
distribution of 2N variables,
e−βHN (x1,...,x2N )
2N∏
i=1
p0(xi),
we can analytically proceed to regroup variables into
blocks (lets call R the action of this regrouping proce-
dure on the distribution) and obtain a recursion relation
6γ
γ2
γ3
γ4
16151413121110987654321
1+2 3+4 5+6 7+8 11+12 13+14 15+16
9+10 + 11+12
9+10
13+14 + 15+161+2 + 3+4 5+6 + 7+8
9+10 + 11+12  +  13+14 + 15+16
1+2  +  3+4  +  5+6  +  7+8    +    9+10  +  11+12  +  13+14  +  15+16
1+2 + 3+4  +  5+6 + 7+8
FIG. 2. Example of a hierarchical model with N = 4.
for the distribution of the block variables
x(k) =
2k∑
i=1
xi
2k
. (9)
After k iterations one has
pk(x) ≡
(Rkp0) (x) = 1√
2piσ2k
e−x
2/(2σ2k),
with variance
σ2k =
1
1− 2β∑k`=1 (γ2 )` .
For k →∞ the limiting distribution is Gaussian,
p∞(x) =
1√
2piσ2∞
e−x
2/(2σ2∞),
with variance
σ2∞ =
1
1− 2βγ2−γ
,
provided β < βcrit ≡ 1γ − 12 . Thus, in this case, the
conditions required for validity of the central limit theo-
rem hold at sufficiently high temperature: the variables
are strongly correlated at short scale, but become weakly
correlated at sufficiently large scales, ensuring that the
asymptotic distribution is still Gaussian, with a suitable
variance.
Quite interestingly, at β = βcrit, the variance diverges
and the asymptotic distribution for the block variables
(9) can no longer be Gaussian, signaling that the vari-
ables are correlated at all scales of the hierarchy. This
is exactly what happens in a physical system close to a
critical point. To obtain a well-defined limiting distribu-
tion, a different strategy to regroup the variables, and a
different limit theorem, must be used. Let us introduce
the new block variables
x(k) =
2k∑
i=1
xi
2kγ−k/2
, (10)
different form Eq. (9). Again, the asymptotic distribu-
tion for these variables can be worked out analytically.
The result is that for
√
2 < γ < 2 the distribution is
Gaussian with variance
σ2∞ =
2− γ
2γβc
.
Even more interesting is the result for 1 < γ <
√
2.
Things become more intricate, and a simple solution can
only be found for small  ≡ √2− γ > 0. In this case the
asymptotic distribution of the block variables (10) is non
Gaussian,
p∞(x) ≈ A e−r∗()x2/2−u∗()x4/4,
where A is a normalization constant and the parameters
r∗() and u∗() > 0 characterize the distribution and are
called fixed-point couplings.
Thus, the hierarchical model (8) is rich enough to pro-
vide a realization of nontrivial limit theorems embodying
the universal behavior of a system near a phase transi-
tion.
Let us conclude this section stressing the deep link be-
tween the renormalization group procedure and a gener-
alization of the central limit theorem. There is an inter-
esting class of stable distribution laws of random vari-
ables with the following property: let Pλ(x) be the prob-
ability of the variable x depending on the set of param-
eters λ (e.g., in a Gaussian distribution the λ’s amount
to the mean value and the variance); denoting with ∗ the
convolution, we have that for the stable distribution law
(Pλ1 ∗ Pλ2) (x) = Pλ(x),
where λ is an appropriate function of λ1 and λ2. For in-
stance, in the case of a Gaussian distribution λ = (m,σ2)
with m = m1 + m2 and σ
2 = σ21 + σ
2
2 . It is remarkable
that the renormalization group can be seen as a convo-
lution with the rule
Pλn(x) = Pλn−1(αn−1x) ∗ Pλn−1(αn−1x),
and one has a fixed point as n→∞ for a suitable choice
of λn and αn.
The simplest Gaussian fixed point (for simplicity we
take m = 0) corresponds to αn = 1/
√
2 and σ2n = σ
2
n−1.
7IV. DISCUSSION
The present Section is devoted to the discussion of
a some technical, as well as conceptual, aspects of the
probability in statistical physics which are often under-
estimated.
A. The maximum entropy principle
We wish to add some remarks about information and
the “it from bit” approach. The question here is whether
statistical mechanics can be seen as a form of statisti-
cal inference. According to a radically anti-dynamical
point of view, this is indeed the case: statistical mechan-
ics is not a theory of objective physical reality, and the
probabilities measure the “degree of truth” of a logical
proposition. In this context, Jaynes22 proposed the max-
imum entropy principle (MEP) as a general rule to infer
the probability of a given event when only partial infor-
mation is available. Let us briefly summarize the MEP
approach: the mean values of M independent functions
fk(X) are known,
ck = 〈fk〉 =
∫
fk(X)ρ(X) dX, for k = 1, ...,M (11)
then the MEP rule determines the probability density
ρ(X) maximizing the entropy
H = −
∫
ρ(X) log ρ(X) dX,
with the constraints (11). Using the method of Lagrange
multipliers, it is then easy to show that
ρ(X) = Const. exp
[
M∑
k=1
λkfk(X)
]
,
where λ1, ...λM depend on c1, ..., cM . When applied to
the statistical mechanics of systems with fixed number of
particles and the only constraint of a given mean value
E for the energy, the MEP recipe leads to the canonical
distribution in a very simple way.
As far as we know this is the unique relevant success of
MEP in physics. Up to now there is not any convinc-
ing evidence of the possibility to use the MEP to de-
rive unknown results, e.g., in non equilibrium statistical
mechanics23; in the following we will discuss the reason
of this difficulty.
B. About probability and tipicality
Let us briefly comment upon the fact that the approach
in terms of ergodicity and that based on MEP reflect deep
conceptual differences about how to consider probability.
It is well known that there are several competing interpre-
tations of the actual meaning of probability24. It is rather
difficult to discuss in detail the different interpretations,
here our interest is limited to the probability in statistical
mechanics, in particular to the link between probability
and real world. Our main aim is to investigate the fol-
lowing topic: what is the link between the probabilistic
computations and the actual results obtained in labora-
tory experiments. Roughly speaking the different points
of view about probability can be classifies in two large
classes: the subjective interpretation and the objective
one.
According to the subjective interpretation probability
is a degree of belief; one of the most influential supporter
of such a point of view is Jaynes with his idea that the
theoretical description of physical systems is governed by
the degree of belief of the observer.
On the contrary, in the objective interpretation the
probability of an event is determined by the physics of
the systems and not by the lack of information of the
observer. In particular ergodic theory, somehow, justi-
fies a frequentist interpretation of probability, accord-
ing to which it is possible to obtain an empirical no-
tion of probability which is an objective property of the
trajectory5,7,25. There is no universal agreement on this
issue; for instance, Popper believed that probabilistic
concepts are extraneous to a deterministic description
of the world, while Einstein held the opposite point of
view26.
Let us try to give an answer to the following bold ques-
tion: what is the link between the probabilistic computa-
tions (i.e., the averages over an ensemble) and the results
obtained in laboratory experiments which, a fortiori, are
conducted on a single realization (or sample) of the sys-
tem under investigation? In a nutshell, following Boltz-
mann, we can invoke the notion of typicality, i.e., the
fact that the outcome of an experiment on a macroscopic
system takes a specific (typical) value overwhelmingly
often27–29. In statistical mechanics typicality holds for
N  1. The concept of typicality is at the basis of the
very possibility to have reproducibility of results in ex-
periments (on macroscopic objects) or the possibility to
have macroscopic laws.
From the limit theorems (as well as the typicality) one
has that the true deep role of probability in statistical
mechanics is the possibility to identify the mean value
with the actual result for a unique (large) system27–29.
The practical relevance of the typicality can be appre-
ciated looking carefully at the most popular computa-
tional methods in statistical mechanics, i.e. molecular
dynamics and Monte Carlo. The first technique is based
on the assumption of the validity of the ergodicity. As
already discussed, strictly speaking, such an assumption
is surely wrong. In the Monte Carlo computations one
uses suitable ergodic Markov chains, therefore the valid-
ity of the ergodicity is sure. On the other hand it is easy
to realize that the success of the method cannot be based
only on such a mathematical base. From Poincare´’s the-
orem, and Kac’s lemma on the mean recurrence time,
one can understand6 that for some observables in order
8to obtain the proper mean value from a time average,
a gigantic number of steps is necessary. Namely a time
O(CN ) where C > 1 and N is the number of degrees of
freedom30.
Therefore the true reason of the success cannot be the
mathematical ergodicity, but the typicality and it is,
somehow, related to the Khinchin’s results, i.e.
• the investigated system has a huge number of degrees
of freedom: N  1;
• in a Monte Carlo computation, usually one computes
only the average of a few observables of physical interest
which involve many degrees of freedom and therefore it
is not necessary to explore the whole phase space.
C. Is then the MEP a cornucopia, or a Pandora’s
box?
We raise here two main objections. The first comes
from the old good principle Ex nihilo nihil (Nothing from
nothing).
In his nice book about statistical mechanics31 Ma asks:
“How many days in a year does it rain in Hsinchu (a city
in northern Taiwan, commonly nicknamed The Windy
City, because of its windy climate)?”. According to MEP
the reply might be: “As there are two possibilities, to rain
or not to rain, and we are completely ignorant about
Hsinchu, it rains six months a year”. We share Ma’s
opinion that the above answer is simply nonsense: it is
not possible to infer something about a real phenomenon,
only based on our ignorance.
But there is a more technical aspect that makes the
MEP approach rather weak, namely the dependence of
the results on the choice of the variables: the MEP gives
different solutions if different variables are adopted to
describe the same phenomenon. This is due to the fact
that the “entropy”
HX = −
∫
ρX (X) log ρX (X) dX
is not an intrinsic quantity but it depends by the vari-
able X used for the state of the system. Using a different
parametrization, i.e., the coordinates given by an invert-
ible map Y = f(X), the entropy of the same phenomenon
would be
HY = −
∫
ρY(Y) log ρY(Y) dY
= HX +
∫
ρX (X) log |Df(X)| dX,
where |Df(X)| is the determinant of the Jacobian matrix,
measuring how the elementary volume changes with the
change of variables.
Let us now reconsider the fact that using MEP is easy
to obtain the canonical distribution. The supporters of
MEP consider this result an important success of the
method. On the other hand there is clearly a negative
aspect: the correct result is obtained only provided we
make use of the canonical variables, i.e., positions and
momenta of the particles. The choice of the specific
canonical variables is not unique, but different choices
are related to one another by canonical transformations
that preserve the Hamiltonian structure of the equations
of motion and enjoy the property that the correspond-
ing determinant of the Jacobian matrix equals unity. On
the contrary using different (non canonical) variables, in-
stead of the Const. e−βH we have g(Y)e−βH(Y) where the
shape of the function g( ) depends on the chosen vari-
ables.
V. FINAL REMARKS
Let us conclude the paper with some general comments
and remarks.
Wheeler’s slogan “There is no law except the law that
there is no law” sometimes can be interpreted in a precise
way: In probability theory there exist limit theorems (law
of large numbers, central limit theorems) which allow for
the understanding of the behavior of physical systems
with many degrees of freedom. Some words of caution
are needed here. Sometime it is not possible to avoid
some details from fundamental theories, for instance, in
the case of the Boltzmann-Gibbs canonical distribution.
In such a case the basic assumption is the validity of the
microcanonical distribution which can be justified by a
dynamical argument, namely the Liouville theorem and
the assumption of (a weak form of) ergodicity.
It is dangerous to believe too much in general princi-
ples (like MEP), whose results, sometimes, can be used
to simplify a description a posteriori, i.e., only after a
deeper understanding of a given piece of physical reality
by means of a more robust mathematical approach. An
example of the above warning is provided by Ulam’s con-
jecture on Boltzmann’s law, which can be obtained with
a stochastic rule in the binary collision process. A care-
ful analysis shows how the correct result is obtained only
with a precise collision rule, and therefore it cannot be
considered just the gift of a general regulatory principle.
To conclude, we stress again the basic role of the limit
theorems in statistical mechanics. The law of large num-
bers and the typicality are the two relevant ingredients
which allow for a conceptual (and technical) link between
the use of probability and the observations in a unique
(large) system.
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